Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2018

Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won't Believe #3!)
Danielle K. Citron
Boston University School of Law

Neil Richards
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Danielle K. Citron & Neil Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won't Believe #3!), 95
Washington University Law Review 1353 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/630

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL EXPRESSION
(YOU WON’T BELIEVE #3!)
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON* & NEIL M. RICHARDS**
ABSTRACT
At the dawn of the Internet’s emergence, the Supreme Court
rhapsodized about its potential as a tool for free expression and political
liberation. In ACLU v. Reno (1997), the Supreme Court adopted a bold
vision of Internet expression to strike down a federal law - the
Communications Decency Act - that restricted digital expression to forms
that were merely “decent.” Far more than the printing press, the Court
explained, the mid-90s Internet enabled anyone to become a town crier.
Communication no longer required the permission of powerful entities.
With a network connection, the powerless had as much luck reaching a
mass audience as the powerful. The “special justifications or regulation of
the broadcast media” had no application to the “vast democratic forums
of the Internet.”
Twenty years later, the Roberts Court had an opportunity to explain
how the First Amendment should operate in the mature Internet of 2017.
Despite the interval of time, the Roberts Court of 2017 took a remarkably
similar approach to the Rehnquist Court of 1997. In Packingham v. North
Carolina, Justice Kennedy announced the start of the “Cyber Age.” The
Internet was the virtual public square, much like streets and parks.
Because the “Internet” was still in its infancy, its impact on expression
was not fully understood. The expressive potential of the “Internet” would
be imperiled in the absence of a hands-off approach. Justice Kennedy
noted that someday, the Internet might be used for anti-social ends. Until
then, extreme caution was in order so the Internet’s democratic potential
could be realized.
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Contrary to the Court’s thinking, the Internet is no longer in its
infancy. It has matured at a breathtaking pace. Virtually all aspects of our
public and private lives - politics, child-rearing, work, health, shopping,
and sex - involve the Internet. If online discourse ever accorded with the
Court’s vision, it does not now. Rather than just the virtual town square,
the “Internet” is bound up in everything and everywhere-whether the
workplace, library, coffee shop, gym, park, public street, town square, or
bedroom.
This article debunks the Court’s magical thinking about the Internet.
The Internet’s expressive opportunities are not available to all on equal
terms, thanks to the wide availability of personal data. Online platforms
highlight favored content while burying disfavored ones. Search engines
produce different, and less advantageous, results to people of color and
women than to men. Cyber mobs shove people offline with doxxing,
swatting, and other privacy-invasive forms of abuse. Online platforms fuel
polarization and filter bubbles, ensuring an electorate without access to a
full range of ideas and information. Fake news spreads like wildfire on
social media platforms that are often people’s main source of information.
We need clear principles to guide and secure meaningful digital free
expression. This article charts a path to provide just that. Part I exposes
crucial myths surrounding the digital speech and privacy in our networked
age. Part II offers a conception of free speech based on a distrust of
power, both public and private. Even if doctrinal analysis does not
account for private barriers to free expression, the project of free
expression should. Part III lays out four essential preconditions for a
theory and a system of free expression in the digital age. These
preconditions are substantive and procedural. They require legal
intervention and extra-legal efforts. They draw some inspiration from due
process guarantees and some from commitments to equality. Underlying
these principles is a unifying normative commitment: If we want to ensure
that our commitment to long-standing democratic theories of free
expression survives its translation to the digital environment, we need to
take a long, hard look at the digital public sphere we actually have, rather
than one that we might want or one that has been advertised to us by
Silicon Valley.
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INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the Internet’s public emergence, the Supreme Court
rhapsodized about its potential for free expression and political liberation.
In Reno v. ACLU,1 the Supreme Court adopted a bold vision of Internet
expression in striking down a federal law—the Communications Decency
Act—that would have limited digital expression to forms that were merely
“decent.” Far more than the printing press, the Court explained, the mid‘90s Internet of web pages and chat rooms enabled anyone to become a
virtual town crier. Speakers no longer needed the permission of powerful
media companies to reach the public, because the Internet levelled the
playing field between powerless speakers and powerful printers or
broadcasters. Unlike mass media that controlled what content would reach
people in their homes, the Internet enabled all manner of speakers and
expression to reach the public at large assuming they had a computer, a
modem and a phone line. As a result, the Court held that the “special
justifications for regulation of the broadcast media” had no application to
the “vast democratic forums of the Internet.” 2
Exactly twenty years later, the Roberts Court had an opportunity to
explain how the First Amendment should operate in the face of a mature
Internet. Despite the lapse of time, and the massive technological shifts to
broadband, social media, and ubiquitous smartphones, the Roberts Court of
2017 took a remarkably similar approach to the Rehnquist Court of 1997.
In Packingham v. North Carolina,3 Justice Kennedy announced the start of
the “Cyber Age,” featuring the Internet as the “modern public square.”
Because the Internet was still in its infancy, he suggested, its impact on
expression could not be fully understood. Law could imperil the Internet’s
expressive potential. Someday, the Internet might be used for antisocial
ends, Justice Kennedy noted, but until then, extreme caution was necessary
to protect the Internet’s democratic potential. 4
Contrary to the Court’s thinking, the Internet is not a babe in the woods.
Nor is it separate from everyday life. Today, virtually all aspects of our
public and private lives—politics, child-rearing, work, health, shopping,
and sex—involve the Internet. If online discourse ever accorded with the
Court’s vision, it certainly does not now. Social interaction, intellectual
exploration, political and cultural engagement, employment, and all other
manner of life’s projects involve networked technologies. Rather than just
1.
2.
3.
4.

521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Id. at 868.
137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
Id. at 1737.
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the virtual town square, the Internet is bound up in everything we do and
everywhere we do it—whether in the workplace, library, coffee shop, gym,
park, street, or old-fashioned town square.
Meanwhile, the Internet’s indispensability is paired with its inequality of
control and opportunity. Private owners of Internet infrastructure, from
content layer to backbone, block, filter, mute, and decrease the visibility of
online expression, making it difficult for some to engage in public
discourse. Not only do companies determine who participates, but they
control what content is available and to whom. Online service providers and
search engines tailor people’s online experiences based on fine-grained
surveillance about their past communications, interactions, and activities.
When searching for “financial news,” for example, African Americans may
see stories on payday loans while whites may see links for low-interest
mortgages. People over forty may not see advertisements for employment,
thanks to algorithms facilitating Facebook Ads.5 While government
censorship remains a danger, communication and participation in the digital
age are imperiled by private power as well as that of the state.
This essay takes a critical look at the theory of the Internet and expression
implicit in Reno and Packingham. In so doing, it seeks to debunk some of
the Court’s magical thinking about the Internet. Contrary to the Court’s
assumptions, the Internet’s expressive opportunities are not available to all
on equal terms. Everyone cannot be a virtual town crier as the Court
imagined. Private entities serve as powerful gatekeepers to digital
expression. The design of our digital infrastructure can preclude people
from accessing online platforms. 6 Platforms highlight favored content while
burying or blocking disfavored ones (more often unpopular speakers).
Search engines produce different, and less advantageous, results to the
vulnerable than to the powerful.7 Cyber mobs shove people offline with
doxxing, swatting, and other privacy-invasive forms of abuse. 8 Fake news
5.
Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin & Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing
Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROP UBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.
propublica.org/article/ facebook-advertising- discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin.
6.
See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (2018).
7.
LaTanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, COMM. ACM, May 2013, at 44,
45; Sonia Katyal, Algorithmic Civil Rights, 103 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author)
(discussing study where women disproportionately see ads for less well-paying jobs than men searching
same terms).
8.
See generally D ANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) [hereinafter
CITRON, HATE CRIMES]; Danielle Keats Citron, Online Engagement on Equal Terms, B.U. L. REV.
ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/bulronline/citron-online-engagement-onequal-terms/; Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009);
Danielle Keats Citron, Yale ISP—Reputation Economies in Cyberspace Part 3, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8,
2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVEL4RfN3uQ.
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spreads like wildfire on social media sites, which may be people’s main
source of information. 9 Internet service providers surveil our online
activities, sharing them with online advertisers who tailor the content made
visible to us.10
Although these massive corporations—whether they call themselves
“social media,” “tech companies,” or “neutral platforms”—hold most of the
cards, the First Amendment has almost no application to their policies. The
central battleground for free speech and privacy will be fought in corporate
boardrooms rather than in the courts. The most important legal instruments
governing free speech on the Internet today are not derived from the
Constitution, but from contract law—the terms of service governing the
relationship between Internet companies and their customers.
Our argument proceeds in three steps. Part I exposes crucial myths
surrounding digital speech and privacy in our networked age. Part II offers
a conception of free speech based on a distrust of power, both public and
private. Even if constitutional doctrine does not account for private barriers
to free expression, we argue, the project of free expression must. Part III
lays out four essential preconditions for a theory and a system of free
expression in the digital age.
Let us be clear at the outset: We remain committed to robust free
expression and to the spirit of New York Times v. Sullivan.11 We believe that
the outcomes in Reno and Packingham are correct. The First Amendment
does and should prohibit the state from reducing digital expression to that
which is “decent” and fit for children; the First Amendment does and should
prohibit the state from indiscriminately barring felons (or anyone else) from
the Internet. But theory matters. And good theories should bear a close
relationship to the messy reality we live in rather than to utopian visions that
ignore obvious power dynamics. Underlying our four principles is a
unifying normative commitment to ensuring that our traditional free speech
values survive the translation to the digital environment. That will require
taking a long, hard look at the digital public sphere that we actually have,
rather than one we might want to have or that Silicon Valley has tried to sell
to us.
9.
See generally Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for National
Security, Democracy and Privacy?, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/deepfakes-looming-crisis-national-security-democracy-and-privacy.
10.
NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE (2015) [hereinafter RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY]; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101
GEO. L.J. 689 (2013).
11.
376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8; RICHARDS,
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, supra note 10.
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I. THE REALITIES OF DIGITAL EXPRESSION
For twenty years, the Supreme Court has remained steadfast in its
characterization of the Internet as a virtual “public square” that enables
anyone to become a “town crier.” 12 That vision overlooks crucial realities
confronting speakers and audiences in the digital age. Jurisprudential folly,
misguided policy, and injustice can result from such misunderstandings.
The Court needs a Brandeis brief on the lived realities of digital expression,
which this part supplies.
A. The Idealized Internet
In Reno v. ACLU, decided in 1997, the Court described the Internet as
constituting “vast democratic forums.” 13 At issue in Reno were provisions
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) that criminalized the
“knowing” transmission of “obscene or indecent” messages to underage
recipients, or “knowingly” sending or displaying to a minor any message
“that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs.” 14 In essence, the law was an attempt to ensure that
content on the Internet was “decent” and fit for children.
The Supreme Court struck down those provisions of the CDA as
unconstitutionally vague. 15 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held that
the law impermissibly risked limiting adults’ access to material, such as
literature, that included content the state might deem “indecent.” 16 For the
Court, Internet expression was too important to be limited only to what
government officials think is fit for children. 17
The Court underscored that unlike mass media that concentrated power
over expression in the hands of the few, the Internet distributed power over
expression to the many. 18 The Court characterized the Internet in this way:
“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups,
the same individual can become a pamphleteer.” 19 The special justifications
for the regulation of content decency in broadcast media thus had no
12.
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
870 (1997).
13.
521 U.S. at 868.
14.
Id. at 859–60.
15.
Id. at 874.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 875.
18.
Id. at 870.
19.
Id.
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application to the Internet.20 The Internet should be treated as a newspaper
rather than a television station broadcasting over a scarce resource. 21
Twenty years later, the Court in Packingham v. North Carolina struck a
similar chord.22 This time, the issue was the constitutionality of a state law
prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social network sites
used by minors.23 The Court talked about the Internet as if little had changed
in twenty years. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, declared that
“cyberspace” was a “quintessential forum for the exercise of First
Amendment rights” much like a public street or park. 24 Social media sites
were hailed as special zones of public discourse. 25 According to the
majority, social networks “provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms
available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.” 26 Social media
“allows users to gain access to information and communicate with one
another about it on any subject that might come to mind.” 27 As the Court
observed, on social media platforms like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter,
individuals can debate religion and politics, look for employment, and
petition government representatives. 28
The Court struck down the North Carolina law because it burdened
substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s
legitimate interest in protecting minors from registered sex offenders. 29 The
government’s interest could not justify a prohibition that operated as a
“complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites
integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.” 30 As a result, the
statute was facially unconstitutional because it excluded sex offenders from
the “modern public square.”31
B. From Myth to Reality
Today’s Internet is not the virtual town square mythologized by the
Court. Although the Internet enables interaction, creativity, discussion,
persuasion, and access to knowledge, it enables far more than public
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
Id. at 1733–34.
Id. at 1735.
Id.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
Id. at 1735.
Id. at 1738.
Id.
Id.
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discourse.32 Online platforms host a dizzying array of activities, from work
and play to commercial activities and group associations. 33 Some sites and
profiles are de facto workplaces. Some establish professional bona fides
necessary to attract clients and business. Some operate as stores with hubs
for consumer reviews. Some facilitate illicit activities, such as the purchase
of drugs, sex, passwords, and stolen credit card numbers. Some are part of
educational institutions or their virtual equivalents. Some are password
protected; others are accessible to all comers. 34
Beyond its one-dimensional view of the Internet as a virtual town square,
the Court makes other important errors about digital expression. As this
section explores, digital expressive opportunities are neither limitless nor
uniform. This results from several factors, including the private nature of
our digital infrastructure; the censorial power of companies (at times exerted
at the behest of non-U.S. nations); the silencing impact of cyber mobs,
stalkers, and trolls; and distinct pathologies of our networked environment.
1. The Nature of the “Public Square”
At the risk of stating the obvious, the defining hallmark of the “public
square” is that it is public. This is true in at least two important senses of the
word. First, the public square is “public” in the sense that it is owned by the
public.35 Think, in this respect, of “public schools” or the “public sector,”
Owned by the people for (at least in theory) the benefit of all Second, a
public square is “public” in the sense that it is open to the public. 36 Public
parks, streets, and sidewalks are available for public access and use as a
matter of constitutional right. The Supreme Court has built the public forum
doctrine on the premise that parks, streets, and sidewalks have been open
for speech “immemorially . . . time out of mind.”37 Legislatures can place
time, place, and manner restrictions on public fora; they can even close
them.38 But they cannot restrict access to them based on the content of
speech or the viewpoint of speakers.

32.
See CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8. We use the term public discourse to mean, as Jack
Balkin suggests, “the processes of communication that allow public opinion to serve as the judge of
society.” Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053,
1072 (2016).
33.
See id.
34.
See supra note 8.
35.
GREGORY MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST AMENDMENT 100
(2017).
36.
Id. at 101.
37.
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
38.
Cf. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d, Davis v. Massachusetts,
167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897).
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The Internet is substantially different from the public square along these
dimensions of ownership and openness. The Internet, as experienced by
most users, is not publicly-owned. Private companies oversee the digital
infrastructure, commonly thought of as a series of layers or stacks.39 At the
risk of oversimplifying, the layers of the Internet are envisioned as ranging
from content that can be read or interacted with at the top layer, transmission
protocols in the middle layer, and physical infrastructure on the bottom
layer. At the top layer, platforms publish content, enabling the posting and
consumption of words, images, and videos. 40 Search engines connect
individuals with content. 41 Browsers organize content into consumable
form.42 In the middle layer, hosts provide the protocols which platforms
require to function.43 Transit providers connect hosts to the Internet.44
Security providers ensure that content loads quickly and is protected from
attack. At the bottom layer, Internet service and broadband providers handle
the flow of data over the network. Throughout, payment systems make it
possible to fund online enterprises. 45
What is notable about this account of the Internet’s structure is that, at
every layer of the stack, virtually all of the Internet is privately-owned.
Private companies control access to the Internet. There are some exceptions.
Government entities participate in the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), the organization that sets the rules for
domain name registrars and registries; provide content on the web at .gov
domains; and occasionally serve as Internet Service Providers.46 But, in the
main, private entities are the Internet’s gatekeepers, determining who gets
access and what online services, platforms, and applications can be viewed,
accessed, and consumed.
2. Digital Gatekeepers & Nation-State Minders
Online spaces—the Internet—are not limitless zones of expression. In
fact, they may be more limited than offline spaces. In practice, the
39.
See Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004).
40.
Matthew Prince, Why We Terminated Daily Stormer, CLOUDFLARE BLOG (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://perma.cc/7NB7-LJGJ.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in an Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1149, 1174 (2018).
46.
Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked
Public Places, 59 F LA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007).
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permissibility and visibility of digital speech depends upon companies’
speech policies and practices. 47 What a person says and reads online
depends upon the decisions of digital infrastructure providers. 48
At the top layer, content platforms exert significant control over digital
expression.49 In her exhaustive survey of the censorial powers of social
media providers, Kate Klonick has aptly described them as the “new speech
governors” due to the power that they wield over users’ expression. 50
Platforms have speech rules in terms-of-service (TOS) agreements and
community guidelines. TOS agreements commonly prohibit child
pornography, phishing, spam, fraud, copyright violations, impersonation,
hate speech, nonconsensual pornography, violent extremism, and threats. 51
Typically, platforms rely on users to report TOS violations. With the help
of moderators52 with varying degrees of review, platforms determine if the
reported content (and sometimes the speaker) can remain online.
Beyond the operation of speech policies in TOS agreements, companies
use machine-learning algorithms to prioritize, obscure, or block expression
before it ever appears.53 On Facebook’s News Feed, some content is
highlighted while other content is hidden or blocked. Facebook employs
algorithms to detect and remove terrorist speech. 54 YouTube employs a tool
called Content ID to prevent copyrighted material from being posted
without the author’s consent. 55 The dominant online platforms—Twitter,
Facebook, Microsoft, and YouTube—are developing an industry database

47.
See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering
Digital Citizenship for our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011).
48.
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
49.
CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 6, at 168.
50.
Klonick, supra note 48.
51.
Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035 (2018).
52.
The major platforms have thousands of content moderators operationalizing speech rules and
practices. Facebook says that by 2018 it will have 20,000 content moderators working on TOS
complaints. Anita Balakrishnan, Facebook Pledges to Double Its 10,000-Person Safety and Security
Staff by End of 2018, CNBC (Oct. 31, 2017, 7:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/31/facebooksenate-testimony-doubling-security-group-to-20000-in-2018.html.
53.
Researchers have found that using algorithms to detect hate speech will result in far more
false positives than false negatives because they cannot capture context—tone, speaker, and audience.
NATASHA DUARTE ET AL., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., MIXED MESSAGES? THE LIMITS OF
AUTOMATED SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 4 (2017), https://perma.cc/B2UE-A26H. Although
natural language processing algorithms can be trained to detect various combinations and collections of
words, they cannot distinguish jokes, sarcasm, or rebuttals of hate speech from hateful statements. Id. at
19. Algorithms also reinforce bias that exists in the training data—that is why they perform less
accurately when analyzing the language of female speakers and African American speakers. Id. at 15.
54.
Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Will Use Artificial Intelligence to Uncover Extremist Posts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2017, at B4.
55.
Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 499, 538 (2017).
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that will collect hashes—or unique digital fingerprints—of banned violent
extremist content for instant flagging, review, and removal.56
The power to control digital expression extends to all layers of the
Internet. Without security protections, it can be impossible to remain
online.57 Cloudflare, for instance, helps protect sites from distributed denialof-service attacks (DDoS).58 After the deadly neo-Nazi march in
Charlottesville, Virginia, the Daily Stormer’s operator, Andrew Anglin,
praised the man who drove a car into a crowd of civil rights activists and
killed Heather Heyer. Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince explained that
hackers urged the company to “get out of the way” so that they could take
the site off the Internet.59 In the face of public pressure, Cloudflare dropped
Daily Stormer as a client.60 Hackers were able to shut down the Daily
Stormer because it lacked protection from the hackers’ DDoS attacks. In a
subsequent blog post, Prince expressed regret about having gotten involved
with policing content. 61
Sometimes, market forces are behind companies’ retail and wholesale
decisions to censor speech. 62 As in Cloudflare’s case, companies may be
caving to public pressure when they take away a particular speaker’s ability
to engage online.63 They may alter their speech policies and practices to
attract advertising fees and advocates’ approval. 64 For some platforms,
combating cyber harassment is key to their bottom line. 65 In May 2013,
fifteen companies, including Nissan, threatened to pull their ads on
Facebook unless it removed profiles that glorified or trivialized violence
against women. 66

56.
Kaveh Waddell, A Tool to Delete Beheading Videos Before They Even Appear Online, THE
ATLANTIC (June 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/a-tool-to-deletebeheading-videos-before-they-even-appear-online/488105/. Hashing is a “mathematical operation that
takes a long stream of data of arbitrary length, like a video clip or string of DNA, and assigns it a specific
value of a fixed length, known as a hash. The same files or DNA strings will be given the same hash,
allowing computers to quickly and easily spot duplicates.” Jamie Condliffe, Facebook and Google May
Be Fighting Terrorist Videos With Algorithms, MIT TECH. REV. (June 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/
DA72-X7RH.
57.
That is, anywhere except the Dark Web.
58.
Prince, supra note 40.
59.
Id.
60.
Steven Johnson, Why Cloudflare Let an Extremist Stronghold Burn, WIRED (Jan. 16, 2018,
6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/XZW3-7D2C.
61.
Prince, supra note 40.
62.
Citron, Extremist Speech, supra note 51.
63.
Johnson, supra note 60.
64.
CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8, at 229.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
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In other instances, companies engage in private censorship to stave off
threatened regulation.67 After terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in late
2015, European regulators excoriated tech companies for failing to combat
terrorist recruitment on their platforms. 68 Their message was clear: online
platforms would face onerous civil and criminal penalties unless their
policies and processes resulted in the rapid removal of extremist speech.69
The major social media companies accommodated EU regulators’ demands
because regulation of extremist and hateful speech was a real possibility in
the European Union. 70
Payment providers can make it impossible for speakers to remain online.
For instance, the sheriff of Cook County, Illinois wrote letters to credit-card
companies demanding that they prohibit the use of their cards to purchase
advertisements on Backpage.com since ads might be used for illegal sexrelated products or services. 71 Backpage responded by seeking a preliminary
injunction against the sheriff for violating its First Amendment rights. 72 The
court held that the sheriff had irreparably harmed Backpage.com by
threatening coercive state action against credit card companies that
facilitated payment of advertisements. 73 The court directed the trial court to
issue a temporary injunction ordering the sheriff to “take no actions, formal
or informal, to coerce or threaten credit card companies, processors,
financial institutions, or other third parties with sanctions intended to ban
credit card or other financial services from being provided to
Backpage.com.” 74
3. Cyber Mobs, Stalkers, and Trolls
In 1997, it would have been difficult to foresee the threat to speech posed
by cyber mobs and individual harassers. The Internet was still largely a tool
for hobbyists and had not become the essential part of modern life that it
occupies today. But now, after ten years of sustained research and public
conversation about the phenomena of cyberstalking and harassment, it is
67.
Citron, Extremist Speech, supra note 51. In the United States, threatening to regulate
protected speech implicates the protections of the First Amendment. Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518,
525 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Threatening penalties for future speech goes by the name ‘prior restraint,’ and a
prior restraint is the quintessential first-amendment violation.”).
68.
Liat Clark, Facebook and Twitter Must Tackle Hate Speech or Face New Laws, WIRED (Dec.
5, 2016), https://perma.cc/3JTT-4DTP.
69.
See Mark Scott, Europe Presses U.S. Tech Giants To Curb Online Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2016, at B4; Amar Toor, UK Lawmakers Say Facebook, Google, and Twitter Are ‘Consciously
Failing’ to Fight ISIS Online, THE VERGE (Aug. 26, 2016, 5:58 AM), https://perma.cc/HBP4-RZ68.
70.
Citron, Extremist Speech, supra note 51.
71.
Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 2015).
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 238.
74.
Id. at 239.
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undeniable that not everyone can freely engage online. 75 This is especially
true for women, minorities, and political dissenters who are more often the
targets of cyber mobs and individual harassers. In a connected vein, people
who lack the economic means to purchase computers, broadband, and highend mobile phones cannot participate equally in digital life.
Consider the case of online abuse. Cyberstalking often involves a perfect
storm of rape threats, doxxing, nonconsensual pornography (also known as
“revenge porn”), and reputation-harming lies.76 Stalkers impersonate
victims on dating sites and call for strangers to rape them. They shut down
victims’ sites with DDoS attacks. 77 They falsely report victims’ profiles as
TOS violations in the hopes that their profiles will be suspended or shut
down.78 Cyberstalking victims have difficulty expressing themselves in the
face of online assaults. 79 They often withdraw from online activities. They
shut down their blogs, sites, and social media profiles not because they tire
of them, but because they hope to avoid provoking further abuse. The
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has described cyber harassment as
“profoundly damaging to the free speech and privacy rights of the people
targeted.” EFF recognized the fact that online harassment silences people,
especially those with “less political or social power” and “women and racial
and religious minorities.”80
Political dissenters have faced online abuse at the hands of authoritarian
regimes. A common strategy of “troll armies” is to drown out political

75.
See, e.g., CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8, at 35–36; Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights
in Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 31, 31 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 2012); Martha Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET
68, 68 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2012); Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools:
Google and Free Speech, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 155, 155 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 2012); J. Nathan Matias et. al., Research: Online Harassment Resource Guide, WIKIMEDIA (July
3, 2015), https://perma.cc/8FMR-64C7; Nathan Matias, Berkman Fellow, Berkman Klein Luncheon
Series at Harvard Law School: Developing Effective Citizen Responses to Discrimination and
Harassment Online (Feb. 23, 2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu/events/luncheons/2016/02/Matias; Citron,
Online Engagement on Equal Terms, supra note 8; Neil M. Richards, The Internet Grows Up?, B.U. L.
REV ONLINE (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/bulronline/richards-the-internet-growsup/; Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012); Ann Bartow, Internet
Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383
(2009); Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 224 (2011); Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment,
supra note 8; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 8.
76.
CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8, at 3.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 197.
80.
Danny O’Brien & Dia Kayyali, Facing the Challenge of Online Harassment, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/J324-46W8.
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expression with spam. 81 Saudi Arabian “cyber troops” flooded Twitter posts
critical of the regime with unrelated content and hashtags to obscure the
offending post.82 The Russian government has tried to silence dissenters by
spreading falsehoods about them online. Human beings and bots, working
on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin, relayed the defamatory posts
through false accounts on social media sites. 83 During the 2016 election,
Russian-paid trolls attacked journalists critical of then presidential
candidate Donald J. Trump.84
4. Filter Bubbles, Polarization, and Other Pathologies
One of the most touted advantages of the modern Internet has been
personalization, whether for content, such as “more relevant”
advertisements, or for software and devices that adapt to individuals’
preferences. Yet personalization has dangers. Almost two decades ago, Cass
Sunstein warned that a personalized Internet risked creating a “Daily Me:”
an informational monoculture that reflected each individual’s personal
interests and biases while providing no information to disrupt
preconceptions or prejudices. Sunstein was particularly concerned that the
“Daily Me” could create destroy our shared democratic culture and the facts
upon which democratic society depends and non-personalized twentiethcentury mass media had preserved.
Algorithmic filtering can push people’s views to extremes. Likes on
Facebook can deepen echo chambers, making it more likely that users see
posts consistent with their views than those contrary to them.85 In turn, when
groups with similar views get together, their members hear “more and
louder echoes of their own voices.”86 As one of us (Citron) has described
the phenomenon of group polarization: “Learning that others share their
worldviews boosts their confidence. People embrace more radical views
81.
Samantha Bradshaw & Philip N. Howard, Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global
Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation 9 (Computational Propaganda Research Project,
Working Paper No. 2017.12, 2017), https://perma.cc/K7EX-7JLM.
82.
Brian Whitaker, How Twitter Robots Spam Critics of Saudi Arabia, AL-BAB (July 28, 2016),
https://perma.cc/C6QH-GF5F.
83.
See TIM WU, KNIGHT F IRST AMENDMENT INST., IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT OBSOLETE? 1,
15 (2017), https://perma.cc/ZWW9-Y55H (describing reverse censorship, flooding and propaganda
robots phenomena).
84.
David French, The Price I’ve Paid for Opposing Donald Trump, NAT’ L REV. (Oct. 21, 2016,
4:55 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/10/donald-trump-alt-right-Internet-abuse-nevertrump-movement/. As French’s account illustrated, much of the abuse was imbued with racist and antiSemitic slurs and images. One of us (Citron) served on the Anti-Defamation League’s Task Force on
Harassment and Journalism, which issued a report on anti-Semitic targeting of journalists. See ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE, ANTI-SEMITIC TARGETING OF JOURNALISTS DURING THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN (2016), https://perma.cc/5JRD-ZY6P.
85.
Zeynep Tufekci, The Real Bias Built in at Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2016, at A27.
86.
CASS R. S UNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 55 (2007).
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because they feel more confident and because they want to be liked. They
often exaggerate their views to convince others of their credibility, which
leads to [a] sort of competition for persuasiveness . . . .”87 Hearing
supportive voices for online abuse, for instance, encourages more abusive
behavior.88
Personalization can result in different online experiences based on
variables other than politics—in ways that often disadvantage the
marginalized. Harvard University Professor Latanya Sweeney found that
searches of black-identifying names are twenty-five percent more likely to
be served with arrest-related advertisements than searches of white
identifying names. 89 The study suggests that there is discrimination in the
delivery of advertisements accompanying searches of people’s names.
Similarly, a study by Carnegie Mellon researchers found that males were
more likely to be shown advertisements encouraging the seeking of
coaching services for high paying jobs than females.90 According to the
study, there was a statistically significant difference in ads shown to men
and women looking for jobs, with men being much more frequently targeted
for ads offering high-paying jobs than women were. 91
II. POWER AND ITS PRIVATE DISCONTENTS
A. Distrust of Power
There are multiple, overlapping reasons why free speech enjoys
exceptional protection under U.S. law, but most of them boil down to power.
In one of the most important separate opinions in American law,92 Justice
Louis Brandeis argued in Whitney v. California that free speech was worth
protecting not for its own sake, but because it safeguarded the social
processes of self-governance.93 In Brandeis’ self-governance theory, the act
87.
CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8, at 63.
88.
Id. at 65.
89.
Sweeney, supra note 7, at 51.
90.
Samuel Gibbs, Women Less Likely to Be Shown Ads for High-Paid Jobs on Google, Study
Shows, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015, 6:29 AM), https://perma.cc/D55G-BQE8.
91.
Amit Datta et. al., Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity, Choice,
and Discrimination, 2015 PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECH. 92 (2015).
92.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice
Brandeis’s concurrence has been described as arguably “the most important essay ever written, on or off
the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment.” PHILLIPA STRUM, SPEAKING FREELY, WHITNEY V.
CALIFORNIA AND AMERICAN SPEECH LAW 134 (2015) (quoting Vincent Blasi). It has been cited in over
100 Supreme Court opinions and more than 250 opinions in lower federal and state courts. Id.
93.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377. See Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and
Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1323 (2010); G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age:
The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 325 (1996).
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of engaging in free expression produces not just merely better democratic
decisions, but better democratic citizens. 94 Free speech allows individuals
to participate in the formation of public opinion. 95 It permits citizens to
influence—and see themselves as having influenced—state power.96
Brandeis’ self-governance theory had a major truth-seeking element:
“freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” 97 More
broadly, free speech is crucial for the creation of democratic culture. 98 Free
speech lets individuals express their values, emotions, opinions, ideas, art,
and knowledge. It permits each and every one of us to participate in the
development (and revision) of shared cultural meanings. 99
Yet at bottom, self-governance theory justifies crucial restraints on
power. The right to free speech
is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the
area of public discussion . . . in the hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.100
As Brandeis put it, the theory of the First Amendment was that:
[b]elieving in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, [the Framers] eschewed silence coerced by law—the
argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so
that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. Fear of serious
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to
free men from the bondage of irrational fears.101

94.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–76; see also Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of
Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 672–73
(1988).
95.
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 604 (1990).
96.
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A F IRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 34–35 (2012).
97.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
98.
Balkin, Free Speech in an Algorithmic Society, supra note 45.
99.
Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, supra note 32, 1055–62.
100. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
101. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–76.
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Concerns about power underlie the other leading theory of free speech
that emphasizes its importance to the search for political and social truths.102
In his dissent in Abrams v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
explained that special protections for free speech are necessary because of
the natural human inclination to silence (by force if necessary) opinions that
we dislike.103 “Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me,” he
wrote, “perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your
power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.” 104 Holmes offered
against this certainty, and power’s tendency to sweep away disagreement, a
principle of epistemic doubt that has remained a defining hallmark of
American First Amendment law. Holmes reasoned that the theory of the
Constitution was that while truth is elusive, it is far better to allow others to
hear what he called “opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death” than to be deprived of that potential insight into truth, or at least the
other side of the argument. 105 As he put it well,
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. 106
Holmes offers this principle of doubt as justification for restraints on the
power of the state censor, the entity that would choke off dissent and
disagreement through the use of its power.
Other scholars have offered a third justification for free expression
protections beyond self-governance and the search for truth – the argument
that free speech is indispensable to individual autonomy. The account of
free speech explains that people cannot decide for themselves how they
want to direct their life projects while under the thumb of the state. The right
to free speech is thus designed to restrain power from interfering with
individual autonomy and dignity. 107

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
See e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
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Ultimately, protections for free speech reinforce the constitutional values
of our polity—democratic politics, culture, truth seeking, and individual
self-development. To protect these values, the project of free expression
warns against power exercised to limit that expression. As Jack Balkin puts
it well, freedom of speech ultimately “concerns power—how to regulate it
and hold it accountable.” 108 Allowing individuals to participate in selfgovernment thus promotes the discovery of truth and builds a shared
culture; and allowing individuals to freely express themselves gives power
its legitimacy.109
It has undeniably been the power of the state that has commanded the
attention of judicial free expression doctrine and theory. Most obviously,
this is because the First Amendment typically applies only to governments
and not to private actors. More deeply, though, the traditions of First
Amendment theory reflect a belief that government cannot be trusted to pick
winners and losers in the realm of ideas because it will “tend to act on behalf
of the ideological powers that be.” 110 Government officials fear challenges
to the status quo from dissenters who aim to replace them. 111 Without strong
free speech protections, outsiders may be unable to challenge governmental
power through the practices of ordinary politics. 112 Judge Easterbrook
explained, in American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, that the Constitution
“forbids the state to declare one perspective right and silence opponents.” 113
Yet as Gregory Magarian insightfully explores in his book Managed
Speech, one of the trends of the Roberts Court’s First Amendment decisions
is that they have reinforced state and corporate power at the expense of noisy
dissenters challenging the status quo. 114 It is becoming a bad time to be what
Brandeis termed a “witch.”
Doctrinally, the First Amendment applies to the exercise of state power
that threatens free speech values. 115 It covers laws, regulations, common law
rules, or any action by a person or entity operating under cover of state law

108. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, supra note 32, at 1060.
109. Id. at 1071.
110. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 302 (1989).
111. On this score, Gregory Magarian agrees (as do we). See generally MAGARIAN, supra note
35.
112. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d per curiam, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 203–04
(1994). As Susan Brison has argued, the distrust of government account of free speech—rooted in
particular political contexts—is more promising than arguments rooted in deontological concerns. Susan
J. Brison, Speech and Other Acts, 10 LEGAL THEORY 261, 262 n.6 (2004).
113. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325.
114. MAGARIAN, supra note 35, at ch. 7.
115. Michelman, supra note 110, at 305.
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or in connection with the state. 116 It extends narrowly beyond the state to
private parties that have assumed a traditional state function like running a
town (though not when running a shopping mall, prison, or public utility). 117
The Supreme Court has taken a functional approach to state action, looking
at the substance of whether state power is being used to direct the content
of free speech rather than its timing or manner. 118 Thus, in New York Times
v. Sullivan, the Court extended the protection of the First Amendment to
private-law defamation rules, for fear that government officials could censor
their critics indirectly through private litigation rather than directly through
criminal sedition prosecutions. 119
Nevertheless, the state action principle is a traditional constraint on
constitutional doctrine, designed to ensure that constitutional law focuses
on the problems of state power, such as censorship and political tyranny.
American constitutional law has been built up over decades with this
constraint and focus in mind, and while it is important to consider the state
action doctrine functionally, it would be dangerous to substantially or
completely jettison it. An overbroad understanding of state action would
limit private efforts to protect free speech. If platforms like Facebook or
Twitter were treated as quasi-governmental actors, they could not act as
“Good Samaritans” to block the assaults of cyber mobs, as contemplated by
the drafters of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. 120 They could not
protect against spam, doxxing, or impersonations. There is good in having
private platforms wield some bounded power to address online abuse and
other activity that imperils free expression.

116. Free speech protections do not hinge on simply categorizing something as speech. Speech is
a social phenomenon. Conduct can express ideas just as well as words can. Speech triggers the protection
of the First Amendment depending on what is being regulated and why it is subject to regulation. The
central question is why we are regulating speech rather than whether something is speech or not. Neil
M. Richards & Danielle Citron, Regulating Revenge Porn Isn’t Censorship, ALJAZEERA AM. (Feb. 11,
2015, 2:00 AM), https://perma.cc/RWT5-ZGDE.
117. See e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1946); Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 569–70 (1972). Cf. DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE
SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE, ch. 5 (2009) (arguing that some Internet intermediaries such as ISPs
should be treated as functional state actors).
118. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1681 (2009). Frank Michelman explains that, “no constitutional
text unambiguously prescribes such a rule.” Michelman, supra note 110, at 306. Although the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses speak of the state as the perpetrator and a
person as the sufferer, an argument can be made for judicial balancing of the evils of privately wrought
deprivations of liberty against the deprivations of liberty wrought by state regulation designed to avert
those privately wrought deprivations. Id. at 307.
119. 376 U.S. 254, 279–84 (1964); see also Solove & Richards, supra note 118, at 1681.
120. See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404–06 (2017).
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Given the state action doctrine, an enormous amount of important
expression lacks constitutional protection against the actions of powerful
private entities, such as platforms, employers, and property owners. The
owners of digital infrastructure, for example, are free to limit the speech of
those over whom they exercise economic, social, or other forms of power.
In a world where much of our traditional public gathering places are
privately-owned, the opportunities for private censorship and interference
with the exchange of ideas are widespread. In practice, censorship is more
likely to come from companies controlling our digital infrastructure as from
state, local, or federal governments.121
Expressive freedom needs protection against private power. 122 But that
protection must come from sources other than the direct application of
constitutional doctrine. If we are interested in the free exchange of ideas to
promote self-governance, truth-seeking, democratic culture, and expressive
autonomy, we should care about private speech restrictions. The state action
doctrine could be amended to prevent certain kinds of private acts of
censorship, but doing so would not fully address the problem of private
speech restrictions without radically changing our notion of public and
private. For better or worse, the public-private divide is foundational to our
modern rights jurisprudence. 123 As Julie Cohen argues, we need to pay
“more careful attention to naming and demystifying emerging patterns of
legal power and privilege” in our digital age. 124
Private entities wield power over free speech that can be tantamount
to—or in excess of—governmental power. They determine what content is
and is not acceptable online. Not all private exercises of censorial power are
equal, however. In the face of private censorship, people may have
alternative outlets to express themselves. An individual blocked from
commenting on The Atlantic’s website could express her views on
Wired.com, or on a blog. A user banned from Facebook could recreate a
social network elsewhere, though it would be time consuming and likely
incomplete. But infrastructure is different. Without Cloudflare’s services,
the Daily Stormer was knocked off the Internet.125 In certain locations,
people may have only one broadband provider—being banned from that
provider would mean no broadband Internet access at all. Cyber harassment
121. See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427,
436–38 (2009).
122. Michelman, supra note 110, at 304.
123. Solove & Richards, supra note 118, at 1680–82.
124. Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119, 1157 (2015).
125. See generally JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE F UTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT
(2008); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76
GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 986 (2008); Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653
(2003).
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victims often find themselves with no choice but to retreat entirely from
online engagement. 126
Then too, a private entity’s amassing of personal data is another way
power is exerted over speakers and readers. Uber’s God View, which had
the capacity to be used to monitor and harass investigative journalists,
demonstrated the power that digital technologies can have over the press. 127
Platforms, search engines, broadband providers, and Internet service
providers have varying degrees of access to, and control over, what we read,
hear, and say online.
Another way to think about censorial private platforms is to consider the
First Amendment’s recognition of the press as a democratizing institution.
That is not to suggest that platforms like Twitter or Facebook amount to the
press descriptively or normatively, though the Supreme Court suggested so
in Reno v. ACLU.128 Instead, it is to recognize the importance of
infrastructures of speech and their importance to democracy and public trust
more generally.
There are other ways besides constitutional doctrine to protect free
speech and expression. Legal protection for free expression need not take
the dramatic form of judges declaring statutes or common law claims
unconstitutional. Although such actions are probably necessary in
extraordinary cases, they are not the ordinary way that law nurtures and
defends our abilities to think and speak as we wish. Law can act away from
the limelight of the Constitution and work to protect free expression in less
dramatic, more subtle ways as well.
Although largely overlooked in American legal culture, statutes and the
common law can safeguard the ability to think, speak, and write freely.
These legal tools are far older than our constitutional doctrine of free speech
and represent an important way of protecting free expression in a number
of important areas where constitutional doctrine is inapposite or ineffective.
Our focus on the very successful project of First Amendment law has left
these other tools in its shadow, largely forgotten and ignored. This is
unfortunate, because these tools are arguably even more important than the
doctrinal First Amendment in protecting freedom of speech.
126. This has been particularly true for people who lack the resources to hire bodyguards and
reputation services. We saw this difference in the online abuse of Yale law students, who lacked a
supportive online community and shut down all social media profiles including Facebook and LinkedIn,
and feminist journalist and law student Jill Filipovic, who stayed online with the help of thousands of
supportive readers who engaged in a Google bomb to ensure that her work remained prominent in search
of her name rather than destructive posts of the cyber mob. CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8, at 69–
72.
127. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 747, 782 (2016).
128. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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Non-constitutional protection of expressive liberties can take at least
three forms. At the most basic level, law helps to create the “expressive
infrastructure” which makes a robust culture of free expression possible.
Free expression is enabled by laws allowing for cheaper rates for
newspapers, mandating common carrier rules for companies involved in the
dissemination of speech like telephone and Internet companies, and public
education at all levels including universities. 129 Common law and statutes
can be used to create parallel protections for free expression, such as the
long-standing common law doctrine against prior restraints, or copyright’s
idea/expression distinction and fair use doctrine.
Where constitutional law is under-protective, common law and statutes
can fill the gap by creating exemptions or other additional protections for
expression. A good example of this gap-filling function is the widespread
passage of press shield laws following Branzburg v. Hayes, which declined
to create a constitutional rule protecting the anonymity of confidential news
sources.130 Another example is Anti-SLAPP laws protecting against
lawsuits brought to stifle speech.
Finally, common law and statutes can be used to directly enable free
expression through the creation of affirmative rights to speak, unlike
constitutional doctrine, which is poorly suited to the creation of affirmative
rights due to a number of doctrinal, separation of powers, and cultural
limitations. First Amendment doctrine cannot mandate the creation or,
alternatively, stop the elimination of parks and other public fora for speech.
It merely forbids government discrimination among speakers based upon
the content or viewpoint of their message. A government that dislikes the
messages emanating from a particular forum is barred by the doctrinal First
Amendment from discriminating against those messages but would not be
barred from closing the forum entirely. By contrast, positive law can create,
fund, and preserve these fora, creating affirmative entitlements to speak.
These are merely a few illustrations of the use of non-constitutional rules
to promote free expression. But unlike in the context of state power, we lack
the same conceptual and moral vocabulary to talk about excesses of private
power. A first step in this process, as we try to ensure the faithful translation
of our expressive values to the digital age, is to recognize the need to
develop principles to guide the deployment of legal rules to enable, nurture,
and protect free expression against the excesses of powerful private and
public actors. The following section advances four such principles.

129. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641 (1967); Stephen M. Feldman, Postmodern Free Expression: A Philosophical Rationale for
the Digital Age, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1123 (2017).
130. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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III. ESSENTIAL PRECONDITIONS FOR D IGITAL EXPRESSION
A. Avoiding Magical Thinking
Like many revolutions, the information revolution unleashed by the mass
adoption of networked technologies has its evangelists and its myths. Early
Internet evangelists tended to emphasize the radical potential for the Internet
to liberate human beings. More recent evangelists have emphasized Silicon
Valley’s “disruptive innovation,” its capacity to continually replace old
business models with new ones. Implicit is the belief that disruption is either
intrinsically a good thing or that “innovation” tends to produce new good
things rather than new bad ones. 131
However, in the two decades since the Internet’s adoption, our lived
experience has not fulfilled these revolutionary promises. Digital
technologies certainly have the capacity for revolutionary liberation, but
they can just as easily be used for oppression. Authoritarian regimes have
embraced digital technologies to monitor, surveil, and oppress their
people.132 Even democratic regimes have eagerly used digital technologies
for widespread surveillance.133 The Snowden revelations kick-started a
conversation about government surveillance that continues over five years
later.134 Government surveillance has been made far easier in the democratic
West by the surveillance-based advertising model upon which “free”
services like Google and Facebook have made their vast fortunes. 135
The Internet of the late 1990s was largely a zone of intellectual privacy;
one in which Internet users (or “netizens,” to use the now abandoned phrase
they used for themselves) could explore niche and unpopular interests free
from surveillance. But as corporations realized that the Internet offered vast
commercial opportunities, and as Congress repeatedly failed to pass
baseline Internet privacy legislation, a surveillance-based advertising
industry ascended. Eager to serve better targeted and “more relevant”
advertisements, the commercial Internet has become the most surveilled
zone of human activity in history. Even if one were to accept the debatable
premise that surveillance-based advertising is a necessary evil to promote
commerce, the prevalence of state and corporate surveillance in our digital
131. “Disruptive innovation,” a term first introduced by Harvard Business School professor Clay
Christensen in 1995, has been adopted as a mantra by Silicon Valley about how best to do business in
the digital age, somewhat to Christensen’s dismay. See Clayton Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive
Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, at 44.
132. EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM 82 (2012).
133. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 10, at 1938.
134. See GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S.
S URVEILLANCE STATE (2014).
135
Id.
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age undercuts the promises of revolutionary human liberation that heralded
the mass public adoption of the World Wide Web twenty years ago.
Disruptive innovation has a similarly mixed track record with regard to
the Internet’s claimed promises of liberation. Over the past twenty years,
technology companies have innovated and disrupted existing business
models, ushering in unprecedented access to information and unprecedented
means of low-cost communication. Yet disruptive innovation has imposed
a heavy price. Google’s search engine may have enabled easy access to
information to anyone with an Internet-connected smart phone or laptop,
but Google’s business model of targeted advertisements has eviscerated the
advertising upon which newspapers have depended for decades.136 While
we can now easily look up when the new season of Game of Thrones will
be available for streaming, newspapers have been forced to drastically
reduce the size of their newsrooms and the quality and depth of their
reporting.137 At the same time, digital diversions—whether streaming
videos, cute pictures of cats, or the advertisements that fund them—may
have made it more difficult to engage in the kind of sustained reading and
critical thinking upon which a vital democracy depends. In his book The
Shallows, Nicholas Carr offers substantial evidence that the skills our
malleable brains need to navigate the connected, hyper-linked, shortattention-span digital world may come at the cost of a diminution of our
capacity for long, sustained thinking and reading. 138
Then there are the problems that social media companies have caused
with their disruptive innovation. Beyond Facebook’s advertising success
(which, like Google, has undermined the revenue model of the free press),
the social media giant has recently come under sustained criticism for its
spreading of filter bubbles, allowing foreign money to influence the most
recent presidential election, and failing to stop the spread of “fake news.” 139
Twitter, on the other hand, has faced lawsuits by abusive individuals like
Charles Johnson alleging that the company’s suspension of their accounts
violates free speech rights under the California Constitution. 140 At the same
time, Twitter has been forced to defend its failure to discipline public figure
users like President Donald Trump, who has insulted and threatened foreign
and domestic enemies, including threatening North Korea with nuclear
136. FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 145
(2017).
137. Id.
138. NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 119
(2010).
139. Alexis C. Madrigal, What Facebook Did to American Democracy, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 12,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502/.
140. Issie Lapowsky, Chuck Johnson’s Twitter Free Speech Suit is Probably DOA, WIRED (Jan.
11, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/chuck-johnson-twitter-free-speech-lawsuit/.
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attack, who has targeted private individuals with all manner of abuse, and
who has mounted attacks on a free press as “enemies” of the people. 141
Our purpose in this analysis is not to demonize the Internet, or the
technology companies that have made vast fortunes through innovative
tools. Our purpose is more modest, which is to suggest that the Internet is a
human creation, and that like all human creations, it has complexities that
cannot be reduced to platitudes like those offered by tech liberation theories
of the 1990s or disruptive innovation theories of the 2000s. Recognizing
this fact suggests that in designing policies to ensure meaningful digital
expression, we must avoid magical thinking of the sort that frequently enters
into technology policy debates. We must make policy for the Internet and
society that we actually have, not the Internet and society that we might
want, or that we believed we would get twenty years ago.
Crucial to the protection of digital speech is to recognize that the
Constitution generally and the First Amendment specifically are not the
only way to think about our commitment to digital speech. Positive law,
social norms, and corporate practices are as important to free speech as
constitutional doctrine. Platforms also reflect the unique cultures and norms
of their users.142 As such, we cannot rely on them, or magical thinking about
the utopian power of “disruptive innovation” or the invisible hand of the
unregulated market (or the self-interested claims made by corporate
marketing departments) to ensure the adequate protection of free expression
in our digital society. Fundamentally, when we stop thinking magically, we
must focus on questions of access and questions of power.
B. Inputs Matter
If we care about digital expression that is meaningfully and broadly
available, then we need to start caring more about inputs. First Amendment
doctrine typically focuses only on the value of expression, and the state’s
impact on that expression. This is an entirely sensible approach for a system
of negative rights limited by the state action doctrine and for a system that
focuses limited judicial resources on questions over which they have the
greatest institutional competence and legitimacy.
But if we care not only about the First Amendment, but also about our
meaningful ability to engage in free expression, then the First Amendment
is not enough. The First Amendment is no protection for speakers whose
141. Neil Richards, Free Speech and the Twitter Presidency, 2017 U. I LL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr.
29,
2017),
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/free-speech-and-the-twitterpresidency/ (written as part of the symposium President Trump’s First 100 Days)
142. Tufekci, supra note 85.
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silence is due to an inability to access the Internet. It is no protection for
speakers whose expression occurred on private platforms that blocked,
filtered, or muted them. It is no protection for speakers subject to retaliation
for daring to engage in expression that met with the disapproval of a cyber
mob.
Simply put, inputs matter. If we care about the meaningful ability to
engage in free expression, and not just the formal capacity to be free from
state censorship, our positive law and social policies need to focus on
expressive inputs. Of course, there are many inputs that matter, including
education and access to leisure time (and even sufficient nutrition), but we
shall focus on three inputs that are critically important to digital expression
in the present day—intellectual privacy, protection from harassment, and
access to the benefits of technology.
First, law must protect intellectual privacy. A critical foundation for
meaningful free speech is the ability to generate new, outlandish, and
potentially subversive ideas. First Amendment doctrine is highly protective
of speakers’ ability to say things that are profane, subversive, blasphemous,
and insulting without fear of state coercion, but it has paid relatively little
attention to the processes by which speakers come to generate ideas in the
first place.143 In a series of articles and a book, one of us (Richards) has
argued that our law should protect the value of “intellectual privacy” —
freedom from surveillance or interference as we think, read, speak privately,
or otherwise engage in the practice of generating new ideas. 144 Yet
government and private surveillance has turned the Internet—once touted
by libertarian utopianists as a realm of unmonitored access to pure
thought—into the single most surveilled realm of human activity in history.
Democratic governments, platforms, and advertisers constantly seek to
monitor what we watch, read, and write online, for a variety of purposes
ranging from the prevention of crime to the pursuit of the perfectly targeted
advertisement. These may at times be useful pursuits, but they are not as
important as the enablement of democratic deliberation. 145
Simply put, when we are watched, we change our behavior, inclining it
to the boring, the bland, and the mainstream. Our constantly-monitored
Internet is a threat to the development of new political and ideological ideas
upon which our commitments to intellectual freedom and democratic self-

143. See RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, supra note 10.
144. See, e.g., id.; Richards, Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 10; Neil M. Richards,
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX L. REV. 387 (2008); Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech,
supra note 93; Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, supra note 10.
145. For a sustained argument along this specific line of analysis, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
#REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017) (arguing in favor of
“democratic deliberation” in favor of consumer empowerment as a value in a democracy).
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government depend. 146 In developing laws to regulate commerce and
surveillance in the digital age, we should not allow the logic of surveillance
that motivates business intelligence and law enforcement to create a data
collection environment of perfect surveillance. Environments of
untrammeled data collection nudge conformity and stifle, if not extinguish,
dissent, eccentricity, and creativity. We need to press back against the
inexorable pull of what one of us (Citron) has termed the “data collection
imperative.” 147
Second, as one of us (Citron) has argued in a series of articles and a book,
law, culture, and technology should be brought to bear against online
assaults that drive people offline. Law is crucial to deter, redress, and punish
cyber mobs and individual harassers who close off avenues for interaction
and expression that the Internet opens for most. A legal agenda would serve
an expressive role as well, teaching us that online assaults inflict grave
damage to victims’ important opportunities and to society at large.
A “cyber civil rights” legal agenda should include tort, criminal, and civil
rights law.148 In theory, victims can sue their attackers for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and public disclosure of private
facts (in case of nude photos posted without consent). In practice, however,
these lawsuits are expensive to pursue and many victims lack the resources.
In what we hope becomes a trend, pioneering law firms like K&L Gates
have devoted pro bono resources to combat online abuse so victims with
little means can sue their harassers. 149 Prosecutors should use the tools that
they have to investigate and prosecute cyber-stalkers, including threat laws
and cyber-stalking laws.150 Crucially, thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia now criminalize the nonconsensual posting of someone’s nude
images online.151 Federal bills to ban nonconsensual disclosure of intimate
images have strong bipartisan support. Civil rights laws should be enforced
against stalkers who interfere with victims’ employment opportunities
because they belong to traditionally subordinated groups. 152
What about platforms that host online assaults? Some platforms solicit
abuse yet still they can argue, quite correctly, that they enjoy immunity from
liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. As one of
146. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, supra note 10, at 107.
Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy, 98 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
148. Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 86.
149 K&L Gates partners Elisa D’Amico and David Bateman are the leaders of this ground-breaking
effort.
150. CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8, at 123.
151. 38 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE https://www.cybercivil
rights.org/ revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).
152. CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8, at 158.
147
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us (Citron) and Benjamin Wittes have argued, the time has come to revisit
section 230’s immunity provision. 153 Section 230 was meant to encourage
self-monitoring from parties in the best position to efficiently prevent harm
to third parties.154 It was meant to immunize platforms from liability related
to under- and over-filtering of “offensive” material.155 The problem is that
an overbroad interpretation of Section 230 enables the exercise of great
power with no concomitant responsibility.156 Sites not only can deliberately
ignore reports of abuse, but they also can encourage and solicit abuse and
still enjoy the shelter of section 230’s immunity provision. 157 Federal
lawmakers should revise Section 230 to condition the immunity on
reasonable efforts to address known illegality.158
Third, the promise of technology must be available to all and not
thwarted by a deepening of the so-called “digital divide.” The economic,
expressive, and other opportunities enabled by digital technologies will be
limited at best if only the privileged can enjoy them. This is a reality that
even Silicon Valley recognizes. 159 However, despite the broad recognition
of the problem of the digital divide, it remains under-theorized and underaddressed in the legal literature.
In privacy scholarship, two influential books have examined the
sociology of how poverty impacts privacy rights. In Overseers of the Poor,
John Gilliom explored how the welfare system deprives recipients of any
privacy agency. 160 In The Poverty of Privacy Rights, Khiara Bridges
powerfully demonstrated that poor mothers are subject to invasive,
persistent state surveillance, whether or not they receive public funding for
prenatal care, at great cost to their self-worth and equal standing as
citizens.161 These works demonstrate how the state uses its provision of

153. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 120; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The
Problem Isn’t Just Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, GEO. L. TECH. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(on file with authors); Danielle Keats Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section230s-challenge-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties. For a compelling argument that section 230 is due for an
overhaul to ensure platform responsibility for discriminatory designs and other civil rights violations,
see Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2018).
154. Citron & Wittes, supra note 120, at 405–06.
155. Id. at 406.
156. See generally Tushnet, supra note 125.
157. Citron & Wittes, supra note 120, at 413–14.
158. Id. at 419.
159. E.g., ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF
PEOPLE, NATIONS AND BUSINESS (2013) (acknowledging the importance of the “digital divide”).
160. JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF
PRIVACY (2001); see also Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2163 (2003) (relating Gilliom’s work to the legal literature of privacy).
161. KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017); see also Danielle Keats
Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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public benefits and concern about child welfare to deprive individuals of
meaningful privacy protections.
In the context of platforms and free expression, however, the literature is
underdeveloped. This has likely been the case because in the American legal
academy, “free expression” has for decades meant the First Amendment;
the vast body of constitutional doctrine has certainly provided a fertile
ground for scholarly analysis. However, one unfortunate consequence has
been that most legal academics have focused on judicial doctrines of
equality of treatment for expression rather than on the practical matter of
equality of access to expressive channels.162 Although few exceptions in the
literature exist, the single-minded focus on legal doctrine rather than the
actual ability to access the Internet means that we lack a basic vocabulary
to talk about power and inequality in the realm of free expression when the
state is not involved. For law to enable free expression in the new digital
expressive environment, we must ensure that the access to that environment
is not limited to the privileged few, and that we have the words, models, and
examples to talk about these problems critically and constructively.
C. Structure Matters
Beyond inputs, we need to pay attention to the social, economic, and
technical structures that facilitate digital expression. This requires us to
focus on the structure of what Thomas Emerson helpfully called our
“system of free expression.”163 Legal rules and policies affecting free
expression must take into account the structures upon which they operate.
Legal rules do not operate in a vacuum, and different rules will operate
differently in different structures.
The design of policies to promote digital expression must take into
account the structures of free speech in a digital age. Two factors are
particularly important in designing these rules. First, our rules must be
suitable for the level of the stack we are talking about. Second, we must
ensure, either via network neutrality concepts or other basic rules of
fairness, that private gatekeepers cannot be permitted to unreasonably
throttle, block, or censor expression.
When thinking about the structure of our system of free expression, we
must first consider the context in which a rule operates, as well as its
relationship to the system as a whole. Consider again the “stack” metaphor’s
conception of the Internet as involving the backbone as the bottom (or
162. There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 1, 50–53; Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, supra note 32.
163. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
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essential foundation) and applications and content as higher up in a “stack”
of technical and social processes. Companies operating at different layers
of the stack have varying degree of power over digital expression. That
power differential should be central to a legal regime designed to protect
against private companies’ power over expression in the digital age. Rules
that make sense for Internet service providers, where there are few
alternatives and limited (or no) competition in the market and where control
over access to the Internet can be total, might make no sense for content
platforms, where there is considerable market competition and alternative
outlets for speech.
In assessing the power differentials of different layers of the stack,
lawmakers must avoid falling under the spell of new technologies and the
magical thinking that they inevitably inspire. New technologies are often
viewed as inherently valuable. The tendency is to credit (and even to
fetishize) a new technology’s potential upsides and discredit its possible
downsides. Big Data, for instance, is often billed as the “New Oil.” 164
Blinded by arguments concerning trade secrets and social utility,
legislatures and courts have yet to reckon with the negative externalities
wrought by the scoring, ranking, and rating of individuals enabled by Big
Data.165 Furthermore, many judges and commentators fail to appreciate the
complexity of the Internet, the nuances of the stack, or the critical
technological and social contexts that operate differently at its different
levels.
The Supreme Court in Packingham fell into precisely these traps of
reductionism andmagical thinking.The Court left some room for nuance,
however. At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the digital revolution
is wide-ranging, and that judges should tread carefully lest they rule broadly
in ways that create problems for the law in the future. It explained that:
While we now may be coming to the realization that the Cyber Age
is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its
full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think, express
ourselves, and define who we want to be. The forces and directions
of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts
must be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete

164. For a critical exploration of this commonly invoked concept, see Dennis D. Hirsch &
Jonathan H. King, Big Data Sustainability: An Environmental Management Systems Analogy, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 406, 408 (2016).
165. See generally Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 41 (2013); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data and the Future for Privacy,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 272 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu
eds., 2016); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393
(2014).
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tomorrow.166
On the other hand, as Justice Alito pointed out astutely in his concurring
opinion (in which he was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas):
“It is regrettable that the Court has not heeded its own admonition of
caution.”167 By treating the Internet and cyberspace in a unitary way, the
Court suggested that all of cyberspace (or at least its “vast democratic
forums”) amounted to a public forum subject to the full force of the First
Amendment, a suggestion that, if taken seriously, could make it needlessly
difficult for legislatures to deal with real problems of crime, abuse, stalking,
hacking, harassment, and fraud in digital contexts.
How courts talk about the Internet matters, not only in how they decide
individual cases, but also in how they frame similar issues for future courts.
Unfortunately, in Packingham, the Court conflated the Internet and social
media as meaning essentially the same thing. Then too, the Court said that
different content platforms were the same—Facebook is interchangeable
with LinkedIn and Twitter, in other words. In so doing, the Court ignored
the importance of context, and in particular failed to recognize the crucial
differences in the different layers of the stack, let alone the different
affordances (and limits) of the various content platforms.
Packingham dealt with an unreasonably overbroad government rule that
interfered with sex offenders’ ability to access the Internet and engage in
the social processes of free expression. But as we have explained,
government power is not the only kind of power that can affect our ability
to express ourselves using digital tools. The private gatekeepers that
exercise control over the Internet’s expressive infrastructure exercise
substantial power over opportunities to speak, engage, interact, and
associate freely. We must be careful to ensure that this power is also
checked in the interests of promoting free expression. Here too, law has a
role to play, in making sure that these gatekeepers cannot unreasonably
throttle or censor the expression of others, through commitments to network
neutrality and other basic rules of fairness.
A systematic exploration of the potential regulatory regimes for the
varying stacks of the Internet is a project for another day. For now, we note
a few rules of thumb. Private power over digital expression should be paired
with responsibility to the public. As a company’s power over digital
expression grows closer to total (meaning there are few to no alternatives to
express oneself online), the greater the responsibilities (via regulation)

166.
167.

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736.
Id. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring).
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attendant to that power. When companies wield power over speech that is
akin to state power, regulation should be tailored to reflect that power.
Consider public utilities. In the industrial age, public utility regulation
emerged to address private power over essential infrastructure, such as
railroads and telephones. In the information age, the backbone layer of the
Internet stack wields similar influence over our political economy. That
includes broadband providers that are already considered common carriers
under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. But it should also include
Internet service providers that determine whether one has any online access
in some locations. The same might be said of security services like
Cloudflare that have the power to wipe a site off the Internet.168
D. Values Matter
If we are to craft laws and policies that promote meaningful digital free
expression, we have argued, we must avoid magical thinking and be
attentive to the inputs and structure of our expressive infrastructure. Laws
and policies affecting digital expression cannot be merely neutral or
narrowly procedural; they must be substantive, which is to say that we must
do our best to ensure that the values of the First Amendment are faithfully
translated to the digital environment. This means that we must steer the
difficult course between recognizing that the digital environment has
features that are different from the mass media and physical world of the
twentieth century, while remaining immune from the romantic lure and
magical thinking of Internet exceptionalism.
We must also ensure that the First Amendment continues to apply in
digital formats but not be seduced by overbroad readings of the First
Amendment. In our opinion, the Reno and Packingham cases came out the
right way: they correctly invalidated clumsy attempts by legislatures that
were either intended to force digital expression into a particular anodyne
direction (Reno) or designed to deal with a real problem in a way that was
highly overbroad (Packingham). But easy cases can make bad law too. Each
case reached the correct result but on the basis of a flawed and unrealistic
view of the Internet as it actually operates, a view that could cause mischief
not only in other court cases, but also in legislative and agency decisionmaking regarding digital speech. Put simply, how we talk about the Internet
matters, and theory matters.
168. Speaking with regret about his decision to drop the Daily Stormer as a client, Cloudflare’s
CEO Matthew Prince said, “I think the people who run The Daily Stormer are abhorrent. But again I
don’t think my political decisions should determine who should and shouldn’t be on the internet.” Kate
Conger, Cloudflare CEO on Terminating Service to Neo-Nazi Site: 'The Daily Stormer Are Assholes,'
GIZMODO (Aug. 16, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://perma.cc/RD9N-ZUEB.
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Beyond the First Amendment’s foundational commitment to debate on
public matters that is uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, we believe that
any theory animating legal rules to protect free speech in the digital age
should keep a number of core principles in mind. Fundamentally, we must
faithfully translate the principles of our analog twentieth century to the
digital twenty-first century. Part of this process will be the traditional
processes of translation that have been discussed in the legal literature since
Joel Reidenberg’s and Lawrence Lessig’s pioneering work in the 1990s. 169
In this respect, the translation to digital formats of hard-won, expressive
liberties against the state will remain as important as the translation of other
fundamental rights, such as the Fourth Amendment’s protection of
privacy.170 But just as digital privacy rights require protection against both
public and private actors, so does the right to free expression. Even when
the First Amendment is properly translated to the digital context, we need
to make sure that its values are advanced against private power in digital
environments where the state action doctrine renders constitutional doctrine
inapplicable. If we are committed to ensuring that our expressive traditions
survive the translation to the digital age, nurturing the capacity of free
speech in privately-controlled online environments will be essential.
No doubt, this part of the project will be challenging. Whereas the AngloAmerican legal tradition has a vocabulary and legal regime for dealing with
government power dating back centuries, if not to the Magna Carta itself,
our tradition is much less developed with respect to private power. Because
we lack an agreed-upon vocabulary to deal with private acts of censorship,
developing legal tools to deal with that problem will be challenging.
Nevertheless, it is a challenge we must take up if we want to ensure that our
hard-won commitment to expressive liberties in the twentieth century
survives the twenty-first.
CONCLUSION
In Packingham, the Court explained that the “the Cyber Age is a
revolution of historic proportions” whose “full dimensions and vast
potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want

169. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE : AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999).
170. See Neil M. Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1441 (2018); Neil M. Richards, Secret Government Searches and Digital Civil Liberties, in A
TWENTY-F IRST CENTURY FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY (Nat’l Constitution Ctr. 2017),
https://constitution center.org/ digital-privacy.
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to be” have not been fully realized. 171 It warned that the Internet’s positive
potential was “so new, so protean, and so far reaching.” 172 On the other
hand, criminal downsides to the Internet were merely hypothetical.173
Although the costs of cyberstalking, impersonation, and identity theft (to
name just a few) were already well documented, the majority described the
Internet as a new technology that had not yet been exploited for criminal
ends: “For centuries now, inventions heralded as advances in human
progress have been exploited by the criminal mind. New technologies, all
too soon, can become instruments used to commit serious crimes. The
railroad is one example, and the telephone another. So, it will be with the
Internet and social media.”174
In one important sense, the Court’s analysis in Packingham hit the nail
on the head entirely. Although its “Cyber Age” rhetoric seems a bit dated,
the Court is exactly correct that the digital revolution is radically reshaping
how we think, read, and communicate. The effects of this transformation on
our expressive culture, arts, and politics cannot be fully understood while
we are in the midst of such rapid and ever-morphing change. It is important,
as the Court suggested, to move cautiously and with intellectual and
epistemic modesty as we try to chart a course to ensure our commitments to
free speech adapt to changing social and technological circumstances.
But as this article has explained, in another more fundamental sense, the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Packingham was woefully misguided. Whether
we call it the digital revolution or “the Cyber Age,” it is essential that we
take our networked society as it is rather than we (or the marketing
departments of technology companies) would like it to be. In thinking about
how to protect free speech and other civil liberties in digital environments,
we must remain modest, but we must also be realistic about the costs and
the challenges posed by our largely privately-owned expressive
infrastructure. At the same time that we are translating our free speech
protections to our rapidly changing digital contexts, we need to be wary of
the problem of private power, so that our new system of free expression is
crafted to deal with the real challenges it faces, rather than ones it fails to
consider.
This is a real challenge, and whether and how we respond to it will be
one of the defining legacies of our time. At stake is nothing less than selfgovernment itself. As we move cautiously but realistically into our digital
brave new world, we should keep in mind the four principles we have
outlined in this article—the avoidance of magical thinking, the importance
171.
172.
173.
174.

Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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of inputs and structure, and the need to remain true to the values that have
animated our First Amendment tradition, when dealing with private power
in addition to that of the state. Other principles will inevitably be needed,
but these four are a good place to start.
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